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Since World War II, direct stock ownership by households has largely been replaced by indirect
stock ownership by ¯nancial institutions. We argue that tax policy is the driving force. Using long
time-series from eight countries, we show that the fraction of household ownership decreases with
measures of the tax bene¯ts of holding stocks inside a pension plan. This ¯nding is important for
policy considerations on e®ective taxation and for ¯nancial economics research on the long-term
e®ects of taxation on corporate ¯nance and asset prices.
Keywords: Capital gains tax, income tax, stock ownership, in°ation, bracket creep, pension funds.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: G10, G20, H22, H30.Non-Technical Summary
A well-known fact in ¯nance is the long-term decline of households' direct equity ownership. In
the United States, individuals owned more than 90% of the stock market right after World War II
compared to less than 30% in 2006. A large portion of households' ownership shares has migrated to
¯nancial intermediaries which manage private pension plans such as pension funds, mutual funds,
and life insurance companies. A similar shift of ownership shares from households to carriers of
retirement assets has taken place in all countries for which long time-series of stock ownership data
exist. There is not a single developed country where households own more than half of the equity
market directly, with the average across countries being just 17%.
Retirement savings are favored by the tax code. Investment returns inside a pension plan
accrue tax free whereas dividends and capital gains on directly held stocks are subject to personal
income tax. In addition, employers and employees can contribute pre-tax dollars, which means that
households can reduce their marginal tax rates by shifting taxable income from high-income work
years to low-income retirement years. As a result of these tax bene¯ts, direct stock ownership by
households have gradually shifted to tax-favored pension plans. We show that the large shift occurs
during the high-in°ation period of the 1970s and the 1980s in countries with quickly rising marginal
tax rates and tax on long-term capital gains on stocks, notably the United States, United Kingdom
and Sweden. In countries with low e®ective tax rates (Japan) or tight monetary policy (Germany)
and no tax on long-term capital gains on stocks, stock ownership structure changes slowly over the
post-war period. We also show that pension funds begin to grow in the United States after World
War II when e®ective tax rates become high, and that mutual funds do not begin to grow until
they are granted the tax status of pension funds in 1982 (401(k) plan).
We conclude that the proliferation of ¯nancial intermediaries in the stock market is the likely
consequence of tax policy. Furthermore, we conclude that personal tax has become increasingly
less relevant for tax policy and research in ¯nancial economics as ownership shares have migrated
from taxed households to tax-deferred pension plans. Finally, we conclude that stock prices would
have been much lower without the dynamic tax clientele shift that we have observed.1 Introduction
A well-known fact in ¯nance is the long-term decline of households' direct equity ownership. In
the United States, individuals owned more than 90% of the stock market right after World War II
compared to less than 30% in 2006. A large portion of households' ownership shares has migrated to
¯nancial intermediaries which manage private pension plans such as pension funds, mutual funds,
and life insurance companies. A similar shift of ownership shares from households to carriers of
retirement assets has taken place in all countries for which long time-series of stock ownership
data exist. With this in mind, the cross-country evidence in Figure 1 on the fraction of household
ownership in recent years is telling. There is not a single developed country where households own
more than half of the equity market directly, with the average across countries being just 17%.
































The ¯gure shows the aggregate fraction of household direct ownership of equity in 20 countries. The
data are the most recently available between 2004 and 2006. Data sources: Flow of Funds (United
States), Statistics Canada, Australian Bureau of Statistics, FESE (2007), Goldman & Sachs (New
Zealand), and Nordic Central Securities Depository (Finland and Sweden). The number for the
United States has been adjusted for the ownership of closely-held ¯rms and non-pro¯t organizations.
The number for Canada has been adjusted for closely-held equity as explained in the text below.
Traditional theory emphasizes that ¯nancial intermediaries exist to economize on transaction
1costs or to solve information problems. In the context of the stock market, professional asset man-
agement allows households to diversify at low cost, to earn abnormal returns from stock picking,
and to bene¯t from corporate governance services. Therefore, one would expect that ownership
migrates from households to ¯nancial intermediaries because transaction costs or information prob-
lems have increased over time. However, brokerage commission and bid-ask spread have decreased
(e.g., Jones (2002)), and there are reasons to believe that information-related costs have also de-
creased along with globalization and the spread of computers and internet. Hence, traditional
theories seem unable to explain the disappearing household ownership.
With these observations in mind, Allen and Gale (1994), Allen and Santomero (1998), and Allen
and Gale (2000), in a sequence of works, explore the idea that the costs of e®ectively participating
in the ¯nancial markets have increased over time. Professional asset managers use complex and
sophisticated ¯nancial instruments to increase returns above what households can attain through
simple diversi¯cation. Hence, better risk sharing may explain why share ownership migrates from
households to ¯nancial intermediaries. The explosion of ¯nancial innovations since 1970 and the
trading volume of derivative securities since 1990 suggest that the bene¯ts of intermediated stock
ownership has increased in recent years. One problem with this explanation is that pension funds
grow substantially in size after World War II, while mutual funds are small as late as in 1980.
If improved risk sharing is responsible for the shift of ownership from households to ¯nancial
intermediaries, one would expect mutual funds to grow and not pension funds. A second issue
is the timing. Not only does household ownership shift to pension funds, but much of the shift
occurs prior to 1980. This is before the trading in derivatives and other complex securities begins.
The timing suggests that the change in aggregate stock ownership structure may be the cause of
¯nancial innovation rather than its consequence.
A decade earlier, economists often looked for tax-based explanations of economic behavior and
debated whether any non-tax explanation had merit. In this environment, Ippolito (1986) proposes
the hypothesis that the growth of pension funds is the result of tax policy. The principles for
the taxation of pensions date back to the Revenue Act of 1921 (TRA 1921), which states that
employers and employees can contribute pre-tax dollars for retirement purposes and that personal
2income tax is paid upon withdrawal of funds. These tax rules imply two tax bene¯ts over direct
stock ownership. First, investment returns accrue tax free inside a pension plan whereas dividends
and capital gains on directly held stocks are subject to personal income tax. Second, by contributing
pre-tax dollars into a pension plan, households shift taxable income from high-income work years to
low-income retirement years. Smoothing income reduces tax liability in a progressive tax system.
As a result of these two tax bene¯ts, indirect stock ownership through pension plans gradually
replaces direct household ownership. The process is slow because contributions into pension plans
are subject to statutory limits and there is no incentive to invest after-tax dollars into a pension
plan as these dollars would be taxed a second time upon withdrawal.
The objective of our paper is to test the tax theory of pension funds. We compile aggregate
stock ownership data and construct proxy variables for the tax bene¯ts of pensions from a detailed
decomposition of eight countries' tax codes over sixty years. We ¯nd that proxy variables that
capture the bene¯t from tax-free investment returns are correlated with changes in the fraction
of household ownership, while proxy variables for the bene¯t from income smoothing have no
explanatory power. For calibrated parameters, the compound-interest e®ect of tax-free returns
appears large enough to justify the gigantic shift in aggregate stock ownership that has taken place
since World War II. At the same time, the tax bene¯ts from income smoothing are surprisingly
small.
Our empirical investigation rests on important time-series variation. Personal income taxes are
relatively small before World War II and the tax bene¯t of pensions is insigni¯cant. However,
personal income taxes jump in the beginning of World War II and create a tax incentive to save
inside a pension plan. Interestingly and important for the argument, income taxes remain at high
levels after World War II and, in fact, rapidly increase through the combination of nominally-¯xed
tax tables and in°ation (bracket creep). By the 1970s, the US upper-middle class is exposed to
e®ective tax rates that approach the statutory maximum of 70%. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA 1986) cuts marginal tax rates in half and tax tables are indexed, but by this point in time,
direct ownership of stocks has largely been replaced by intermediated ownership and reached the
low levels we see in Figure 1. The institutional shift from pension funds to mutual funds also
3supports the tax argument. Pension funds grow rapidly after World War II and peak with an
ownership share of 28% of the stock market in 1985. Mutual funds grow after the enactment of
401(k) and peak at the end of our time-series with an ownership share of 20% of the stock market.
In a nutshell, mutual funds become important when they are granted the tax status of pension
funds.
The empirical investigation also exploits important cross-country variation. Personal income
tax and in°ation in°uence stockholders in two ways. First, dividends are taxed as personal income
and are, therefore, subject to the general bracket creep before TRA 1986. Second, capital gains
taxation is nominal and stockholders must pay personal income tax on in°ationary gains. In our
data, the combined e®ects of tax and in°ation appear to have the strongest impact on the stock
ownership structures in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden, three countries with high
e®ective tax rates, bracket creep, and taxation of long-term capital gains. At the other end of the
spectrum, the combined e®ects of tax and in°ation appear to be relatively mild in Germany with
tight monetary policy and in Japan with low e®ective tax rates. In addition, neither Germany nor
Japan taxes long-term capital gains.
Previous empirical tests of the tax theory of pension funds have used micro-level household
data.1 These papers correlate households' savings decisions with marginal tax rates. One limitation
of this approach is that the marginal tax rate is a function of the savings decision. We use macro-
level data. Our statistical results are robust to a range of proxy variables for the marginal tax
rate including the average statutory rate and the top statutory rate, which are immune to the
endogeneity problem of the other studies.
We conclude that the proliferation of ¯nancial intermediaries in the stock market is the likely
consequence of tax policy. Standard textbooks of ¯nancial intermediation largely neglect the role of
intermediaries as carriers of tax bene¯ts. Furthermore, we conclude that personal tax has become
increasingly less relevant for tax policy and research in ¯nancial economics as ownership shares
have migrated from taxed households to tax-deferred pension plans. Nevertheless, personal tax
on dividends and capital gains appear regularly in the policy debate, and textbooks in corporate
1A reference list of working papers can be found in Bernheim (2002).
4¯nance present theories of capital structure and payout policy under the assumption that households
own all shares. Finally, within the rami¯cations of Tax-CAPM (Brennan (1970)), we conclude that
stock prices would have been much lower without the dynamic tax clientele shift that we have
observed. Sialm (2008) explores this proposition in time-series data from the United States.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows the main stylized facts. Section 3
presents the hypothesis and the methodology. Section 4 discusses personal income tax systems in
the eight sample countries. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Alternative explanations are
discussed in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. The appendix provides details on the tax rules in
each of the sample countries.
2 Evolution of Aggregate Stock Ownership
This section reports common trends in aggregate stock ownership in eight developed countries: the
United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland.
2.1 Ownership Data
Annual ownership statistics exist for the United States since 1945, Japan 1949, Germany 1950,
Canada 1961, and France 1977. Ownership data for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland are
incomplete and only available for some years. The data sources are listed in the notes of Table 1.
The US ownership shares are reported as fractions of listed and non-listed stocks. The data are
constructed by the Federal Reserve, which starts with the market value of listed stocks, adds an
estimate of non-listed stocks, eliminates inter-corporate ownership, and subtracts the ownership of
¯nancial institutions. The residual is labeled the \household sector" and consists of households and
non-pro¯t organizations. This methodology means that the US household sector is upward biased
relative to the household sector in most other countries in Figure 1. The bias arises from including
non-listed stocks and non-pro¯t organizations, and from eliminating inter-corporate ownership. The
bias from non-listed stocks can be estimated from the di®erence between the Flow of Funds total
and stock market capitalization. The ownership of non-pro¯t organizations is available from 1987{
2000 (Table L.100a). Non-listed stocks and non-pro¯t organizations account for approximately four
5percentage points each of the household sector in 2006. Correcting for these biases, the fraction
of household ownership in the United States is 30%. We have no methodology to estimate inter-
corporate ownership.2 In the statistical analysis below, we use the original numbers from the Flow
of Funds.3
The Canadian ownership shares are constructed as in the United States except that the total
is de¯ned as the book value of listed and non-listed stocks. The household sector is derived as the
residual and consists of actual households and non-pro¯t organizations. Inter-corporate ownership
is explicit, but quite small. The book value of listed and non-listed stocks exceeds the market value
of listed stocks by 26 percent over the 1980{2005 period. Therefore, we adjust the fractions from
Statistics Canada by the overshooting 26 percent. Speci¯cally, for households, we subtract 0.26
from the observed fraction of household ownership and divide by 0.74. For all others sectors, we
divide the observed fraction of ownership by 0.74. The adjusted fraction of household ownership
in 2006 is 29% as shown in Figure 1.
The Japanese ownership shares are reported as fractions of the number of shares outstanding
before 1970 and as fractions of market values from 1970 onwards. Given that household portfolios
tend to be concentrated in small cap stocks, the aggregate household ownership share in 1949{
1970 is likely to be overestimated. For the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, the
ownership shares are fractions of market values. The UK ownership statistics are based on company
surveys with the most recent ownership statistics from the share registry. The o±cial share registry
is also the basis for the ownership statistics from recent years in Sweden (since 1975) and Finland
(since 1994). The older data from Sweden and Finland are compiled using a variety of methods.4
2According to Statistics of Income, 1960{2007, non-¯nancial corporations receive 9% of taxable dividends over the
period 1960{2007. We do not use this estimate because we do not know the proportion of inter-corporate dividends
that are paid by fully-owned subsidiaries.
3Below, we analyze changes rather than levels of ownership. The level bias does not in°uence the statistical
inference if the level is uncorrelated with changes in ownership. Poterba and Samwick (1995) and French (2008)
make further attempts to adjust the household sector.
4Sweden: the 1950 data are based on a survey of household ¯nances by Statistics Sweden. The 1961 and 1970 data
are computed as the residual from point estimates of the portfolios of ¯nancial institutions and business corporations.
The ownership fractions are based on market values. Finland: the 1958 data are based on tax-assessed values, the
1972 data on market values, and the 1980{1986 data on nominal share values.
62.2 Common Patterns
Table 1 reports the level of stock ownership for six broad investor classes at three points of time:
the earliest available data point, 1990, and the most recent data point. For Japan and Germany,
we choose 1953 as the starting point to eliminate the e®ects of some initial turbulence shortly after
World War II. The table provides several clear patterns.
Household ownership decreases. Column (1) shows that the reduction in the fraction of
household ownership is very large. The di®erence between the ownership shares in the ¯rst and
the third rows in each panel measures how much it falls since World War II. The equally-weighted
average of the decline across the eight countries is 39.4%.
Financial institutions ownership increases. The ownership fractions of pension funds, in-
vestment funds, and insurance companies are shown in columns (2){(4). At ¯rst glance, the growth
in ¯nancial institutions is large. To get a quantitative measure of this long-term growth, we sum
across columns (2){(4) and take the di®erence between the sum in the ¯rst and the third rows in
each panel. The average di®erence across the eight countries is 24.2%.
Inter-corporate ownership increases before 1990. Inter-corporate ownership in column (5)
is signi¯cant in the countries placed in the bottom of Table 1. The average di®erence between the
¯rst and the second row in Sweden, Japan, Germany, and Finland is 12.7%. We exclude France
with a relatively short time-series.
Foreign ownership increases after 1990. The foreign ownership fraction is reported in col-
umn (6). Foreign ownership takes o® in 1990 after the removal of capital controls (OECD (2002)).5
Foreign ownership decreases between 1961 and 1990 in Canada when the country gains political
5Capital controls in Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, and United Kingdom were adopted in
preparation for or during World War II. Other countries established capital controls in the immediate reconstruction
period after the war. Canada removed its capital controls in 1951 and Germany in 1958. The United States had
capital controls in place during the Vietnam War (1963{1973). The process of removing capital controls began in the
United Kingdom in 1979 and continued in Japan 1980, Australia 1983, France 1986, Sweden 1989, Italy and Norway
1990, and Finland 1991.
7Table 1: Evolution of Stock Ownership
Pension Investment Insurance Non-¯nancial Foreign
Households funds funds companies businesses investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States
1945 93.1 0.0 1.5 2.3 n/a 2.3
1990 55.5 25.2 7.1 4.6 n/a 6.9
2006 38.5 20.2 22.9 6.6 n/a 10.3
Canada
1961 48.6 2.7 2.4 2.0 4.0 27.0
1990 44.9 22.2 4.4 5.6 1.8 6.1
2006 28.9 18.5 13.3 11.2 1.1 9.9
United Kingdom
1957 65.8 3.4 5.7 8.8 2.7 4.4
1990 20.3 31.7 7.7 20.4 2.8 11.8
2004 14.1 15.7 5.2 17.2 0.6 32.6
Sweden
1950 70.0 2.5 0.0 1.5 5.1 7.5
1990 18.1 8.0 8.5 14.6 22.3 7.7
2006 14.3 5.3 11.2 8.1 9.0 37.2
Japan
1953 53.8 n/a 6.7 n/a 13.5 1.7
1990 20.4 10.7 3.7 15.9 30.1 4.7
2006 18.1 21.4 4.7 7.6 20.7 26.7
Germany
1953 32.8 n/a n/a 1.2 39.9 10.7
1990 17.8 n/a 1.3 11.7 43.4 12.7
2005 12.5 n/a 5.1 12.4 27.8 20.1
France
1977 29.5 n/a 7.3 6.4 25.3 8.5
1990 26.2 n/a 10.8 7.2 23.3 15.4
2005 6.9 n/a 13.4 5.7 21.3 39.5
Finland
1958 52.1 n/a n/a 1.6 12.9 3.1
1990 24.8 n/a n/a 10.1 26.5 8.0
2004 8.7 3.8 0.1 1.4 3.4 70.7
The table shows the ownership shares of broad investor classes. Pension funds include private pension funds,
public pension funds, social security funds and, in Japan, trust banks and annuity trusts. Investment funds are
mutual funds, closed-end funds, and exchange-traded funds. In Sweden and Germany, closed-end funds and holding
companies are not included. Insurance companies represent life insurance and property and casualty insurance.
The rows do not add up to 100%. The ownership of banks, holding companies, non-pro¯t organizations, the public
sector, and other investor classes are omitted. Data sources: Flow of Funds (United States); Statistics Canada;
Revell and Moyle (1966), Moyle (1971), and Statistics United Kingdom; Spº ant (1975), Boman (1982), and Statistics
Sweden; the Shareholder Survey and the Fact Book of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Japan); Deutsches Aktieninstitut
(Germany); Bank of France; Grandell (1959), Laakso (1979), Airaksinen and Kallinen (1987), Karhunen and
Keloharju (2001) (Finland).
8independence from the United Kingdom.
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The ¯gure shows the aggregate ownership fraction of households and ¯nancial institutions (pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurance companies) in percent.
Figure 2a plots the complete time-series of household and institutional ownership (pension
funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies) in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom,
and Sweden. The decrease in household ownership corresponds closely to the increase in institu-
tional ownership in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom. In Sweden, non-¯nancial
corporations pick up the residual (not shown). The plots illustrate that the rate of change varies
over time. In the United States, the fraction of household ownership decreases at an accelerating
9rate before TRA 1986. In Canada, the fraction of household ownership does not begin its decline
until 1980. In the United Kingdom, household ownership decreases steadily until 1990 after which
the time-series of household ownership becomes stationary. In Sweden, we observe a dramatic re-
duction in the fraction of household ownership between 1970 and 1990, when the ownership fraction
decreases by 40 percentage points or by approximately two percentage points per year.
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The ¯gure shows the aggregate ownership fraction of households and ¯nancial institutions (pension funds,
mutual funds, and insurance companies) in percent.
Figure 2b plots the time-series of household and institutional ownership in Japan, Germany,
France, and Finland. For Japan, we use di®erent symbols for the time periods before and after
1970 to mark the merger of two time-series with di®erent qualities. The four plots emphasize
10interesting cross-country variation relative to the countries in Figure 2a. Household ownership
decreases slowly in Japan in 1970{2006, when ownership shares are based on market values, in
Germany throughout most of the post-war period, and in France and Finland before the entrance
of foreign investors around 1990. The starting point for the fraction of household ownership is
also lower than in Figure 2a. We do not know much about ownership structure before World War
II. Small-sample evidence by Franks, Mayer, and Wagner (2005) suggests that the transformation
from direct ownership by households to intercorporate ownership takes place in Germany in the
1920s and the 1930s.























































The two ¯gures show the stock ownership fractions of private and public pension funds and of mutual funds in
percent of all stocks. The ¯gure for mutual funds also marks the introduction of 401(k) plans in 1982. Source:
Flow of Funds.
Figure 3 plots the time-series of stock ownership shares of U.S. pension funds and mutual funds,
respectively. Pension funds grow after World War II. Their ownership share peaks in 1985. Mutual
funds are initially small and do not begin to grow before the contribution limits for employer-
sponsored 401(k) plans have been speci¯ed by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA
1981).6 We see a sharp decline in the ownership share of private pension funds after 1985. These
ownership patterns suggest that retirement assets move from de¯ned bene¯t plans managed by
6Time-series of bond ownership shares show similar traits. Mutual funds hold less than 2% of the taxable bond
market in 1981 and increase their holdings to approximately 10% in 2006.
11pension funds to de¯ned contribution plans managed by mutual funds.
3 Hypothesis and Methodology
3.1 Tax Theory of Pension Funds
As stated in the Introduction, the principles for the taxation of private pensions date back to TRA
1921. Employer and employee contributions to private pension plans are made before tax, invest-
ment returns accrue tax free, and distributions are taxed as personal income. The consumption-tax
treatment of pensions is di®erent from the income-tax treatment of regular savings, where contri-
butions are taxed at the time of investment, investment returns are taxed upon realization, but
distributions are exempt from personal tax. The tax code requires that a pension liability is backed
by o®-balance sheet assets held by a ¯nancial intermediary. Therefore, households must choose in-
direct ownership to earn the related tax bene¯ts. Ippolito (1986) proposes the hypothesis that the
growth of pension funds in the United States is a direct consequence of the di®erence in taxation
of pensions and regular savings. Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) that allow households to
hold stocks directly are relatively recent additions.7
The consumption-tax treatment of funded pension schemes is the general principle used in all
the sample countries, but the institutional arrangements vary widely. In the United States, pension
assets are managed by pension funds, mutual funds, and life insurance companies. Pension funds
and life insurance companies dominate the United Kingdom and Canada, and trust banks play the
role of pension funds in Japan. Life insurance companies o®er funded pension plans in Germany,
Sweden, and Finland, where company pension funds are small. Book reserves play an important
role in Germany, Japan, and Sweden. Many private pension plans in France are unfunded (pay as
you go). Public pension plans such as the US social security system tend to be unfunded and are
not part of our analysis.
The following stylized setting illustrates the argument. Suppose an individual chooses between
7IRAs can be found in Canada from 1957, United States 1975, France 1990, Sweden 1994, and Germany 2002.
Using data from the Investment Company Institute (ICI), we estimate that 3% of US equities are held directly in
IRAs.
12saving inside or outside a pension plan. The annual rate of return is r and the time to retirement is
N years. Personal income is taxed at rate ¿0 when it is earned and at rate ¿w when it is withdrawn.
Investment returns outside the pension plan are taxed at rate ¿i;i = 1;:::;N. All taxes and the
horizon are known at time 0. Consider an individual who decides to set aside $100 pre-tax money
for retirement. If he invests outside the pension plan, the after-tax payo® after N years equals:
H = [100(1 ¡ ¿0)] £ [1 + r(1 ¡ ¿i)]N: (1)
Equation (1) shows that savings are taxed at rate ¿0 when income is earned and at rate ¿i when
capital income is reinvested. Hence, household savings outside the pension plan are taxed twice.






£ (1 ¡ ¿w): (2)
Contributions to the pension plan can be made with pre-tax money, investment returns accrue tax
free, and distributions are taxed at rate ¿w. Hence, savings inside the pension plan are taxed only
once.
Equations (1) and (2) are equal and the individual is indi®erent between saving outside or inside
the pension plan if ¿0 = ¿w and ¿i = 0 for all i. This implies that saving inside the pension plan
o®ers two potential tax bene¯ts. First, the individual bene¯ts from income smoothing when the tax
schedule is progressive and ¿0 > ¿w, i.e., the individual reduces his life-time tax burden by saving
when income is high and withdrawing when income is low. Second, investment returns inside the
pension plan accrue tax free, ¿i = 0. If we extend the model to cover uncertainty and risk aversion,
saving inside a pension plan o®ers the additional advantage of risk sharing with the government: if
realized returns are high, the individual can a®ord to pay the tax, and if realized returns are low,
the tax obligation is reduced. In other words, a risk-averse investor prefers an uncertain future tax
liability to a certain tax payment today.8
These arguments apply to both stocks and bonds. When the individual can simultaneously
8In addition, interest rate uncertainty increases the advantage of indirect ownership because P and H are convex
functions.
13invest in both securities, it can be tax e±cient to ¯ll up the pension plan with bonds and hold the
desired stock portfolio outside the pension plan.9 To the extent that the individual cannot fund
this investment portfolio himself, it is assumed that he can borrow. If borrowing is not feasible,
the individual ¯rst purchases bonds inside the pension plan, then stocks until the contribution
limit is binding and, ¯nally, invests in stocks outside the pension plan. The fact that pension
carriers hold large stock positions, as shown in Section 2, suggests that borrowing is infeasible and
that contribution limits are not binding. Contribution limits tend to be generous because private
pension plans are designed to provide su±cient retirement income for high-income employees. Tax
laws support those limits for the simple reason that retirement accounts cannot be used for other
purposes than retirement (Ippolito (1986)). Data on contributions to IRAs in the United States
and Canada also show that most households do not contribute the maximum allowed.
For the various reasons outlined above, households have a tax incentive to switch from direct
to indirect ownership. Is it a plausible explanation for the evolution of aggregate stock ownership?
First, households do not have to make an active decision on their own. Retirement bene¯ts are
often negotiated between the employer and labor unions, so private pension plans are o®ered as
standard contracts to all employees of a company, an industry, or the entire country (e.g., Sweden).
This means that information about the tax bene¯ts spread fast to a broad population. Second, the
tax theory of pension funds does not say anything about the speed by which direct ownership is
replaced by indirect ownership, but there are good reasons to believe that the process is slow and
may take a half century to complete as suggested by the evidence in Section 2 above. Households
contribute to their pension plans through payroll deduction, which by construction is a slow process
of building retirement wealth. Moreover, households do not want to shift after-tax money into a
pension plan as this would subject this money to a second round of income taxation. Third, we do
not expect ownership to migrate entirely to ¯nancial institutions because there are costs associated
with holdings stocks in a pension plan. Assets held inside a pension plan are illiquid, there are
many other reasons to save, and households may hold stocks for speculation or for incentive reasons
(insider ownership).10 In addition, there are investment restrictions and stocks that the investor
9Shoven (1999), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004), Huang (2008).
10Early withdrawal or borrowing against the assets in the pension plan are subject to penalty, if at all possible.
14desires may not be available inside the pension plan. For example, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) states that pension funds are subject to the prudent-man rule, which
may limit investment options.
Equations (1) and (2) have been derived for the private pension system of the United States,
but the equations apply to other institutional environments. For example, under the book reserve
systems in Germany, Japan, and Sweden, actuarial returns on investments are used instead of
market returns. Actuarial returns also accrue tax free. When private pension plans are unfunded
as many plans are in France, the household bene¯ts from income smoothing, but not from tax-free
investment returns. The pay-as-you-go plan is, therefore, a special case. Equations (1) and (2)
ignore some institutional details. Social security taxes are levied on wages, but not on employer
contributions to pension plans. Escaping social security tax is, therefore, an additional tax bene¯t
of saving inside a pension plan. Social security taxes are capped and, therefore, irrelevant at higher
income levels that matter more for contributions to private pension plans. There are exceptions.
In the United States, the cap on payments into the public health system (medicare) is removed
in 1990 and, in Sweden, where social security tax rates are quite high, the cap on social security
contributions is removed in 1968. Equations (1) and (2) also ignore corporate tax because wages and
contributions to private pension funds are tax deductible expenses for the ¯rm. In countries where
pension liabilities are held on the books, contributions are also made before tax, but corporate tax
must be paid, when the book reserves are dissolved. Hence, corporate tax is deferred along with
personal tax. We ignore this feature because o®-balance sheet pension plans are also available in
countries where book reserves are used.
3.2 Empirical Measures
First, we construct a measure of the bene¯t of avoiding tax on investment income. Equations (1)
and (2) approximate the taxation of bonds rather than stocks. Therefore, to derive an empirical
measure, let d be the expected dividend yield, g the expected capital gains rate, and ¿d and ¿g the
marginal tax rates on dividends and capital gains, respectively. The expected rate of return from
15holding stocks inside the pension plan is:
r = (1 + d)(1 + g) ¡ 1 ¼ d + g; (3)
and the expected rate of return from direct stock ownership outside the pension plan is:
r¿ = [1 + d(1 ¡ ¿d)] £ [1 + g(1 ¡ ¿g)] ¡ 1 ¼ (1 ¡ ¿d)d + (1 ¡ ¿g)g: (4)
In°ation is central to the empirical analysis and we therefore work with real rates of return. Let
i denote the expected in°ation rate. A simple measure is the di®erence between the real rate of





Expected in°ation enters the equation in the denominator. It also enters in the marginal tax rates
¿d and ¿g (bracket creep) and in the capital gains growth rate g because the taxation of capital
gains is nominal.11
Next, we construct a measure of the bene¯t to income smoothing. For simplicity, we assume
certainty, zero risk-free interest rate, and constant life-time income. An individual works N years
and needs retirement income for M years. Let Y denote annual income and T(Y ) tax liability on
this income. The life-cycle hypothesis implies that the individual chooses the same consumption
rate Á = N=(N + M) throughout his life time. If the individual makes regular savings outside
the pension plan, life-time tax liability equals N ¢ T(Y ). If instead the individual saves inside the
pension plan, he can save pre-tax income and reduce life-time tax liability on earned income to
(N + M) ¢ T(ÁY ). Tax liability is lower when the individual saves inside the pension plan and the
tax code is progressive. We measure life-time tax savings from income smoothing as a fraction of
life-time income taxes:




11To neutralize the latter problem, capital gains are indexed in the United Kingdom from 1982-1998.
16SMOOTH quanti¯es the maximum bene¯t to income smoothing if implemented optimally over a
life time. It is larger with a more volatile income stream (we assume constant income), while saving
for other reasons than minimizing tax liability reduces it.
3.3 Parameters
The empirical variables derived above require parameter estimates for marginal tax rates, expected
stock returns, and in°ation. Tax rates are collected from a variety of sources listed in the Ap-
pendix. GDP per capita is taken from International Monetary Fund (2009), dividend yields from
Global Financial Data, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from International Historical Statis-
tics (Mitchell (2007)). We are also interested in life-expectancy statistics, which are available from
the Human Mortality Database.12
3.3.1 Marginal Tax Rates
We construct a proxy for the marginal tax rate of a representative household that chooses between
holding stocks inside or outside a pension plan. We assume that the representative household has the
following two features: First, it has high enough income that government-provided, public pensions
are insu±cient to cover consumption needs during retirement years. Second, the representative's
income is low enough that the maximum retirement bene¯ts from private pension plans are a
signi¯cant portion of retirement income. As our base case, we assume that the representative
household has an annual income of ¯ve times GDP per capita (GDP5). The marginal tax rate
of this household on dividend income can be computed from tax tables and GDP-per-capita time
series. While the choice of the multiple ¯ve is somewhat arbitrary, we examine the robustness of
our results to alternative income multiples.
Capital gains taxation is markedly di®erent from dividend taxation. First, the statutory tax
rate on long-term capital gains is usually lower than the statutory rate on short-term gains and it is
often zero. Second, capital gains tax can be postponed until the stock is sold. The value of deferral
of capital gains has been subject to much debate. Miller (1977) refers to conventional folk wisdom
12University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Avail-
able at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de.
17that 10 years of tax deferral is almost as good as exemption from tax. Bailey (1969) calculates the
value of deferral to 50% of the statutory rate, Protopapadakis (1983) ¯nds estimates in the order
of 25%, and Chay, Choi, and Ponti® (2006) ¯nd it to be 55%. Green and Holli¯eld (2003) model
the advantage of deferral and ¯nd numerically that the e®ective tax rate on capital gains amounts
to approximately 50{60% of the statutory rate. We assume that the e®ective capital gains tax rate
is 50% of the long-term statutory rate evaluated at the annual income ¯ve times GDP per capita.
3.3.2 Expected Stock Returns and In°ation
Estimates of expected dividend yield and capital gains rate are intrinsically noisy. We make simple
¯rst-order approximations and pursue a number of robustness checks. We assume that the expected
dividend yield is d = 4%, and that the expected capital gains rate is 2% plus expected in°ation
measured as a three-year moving average of changes in CPI. The assumptions imply that the
expected real rate of return on stocks is approximately 6% before tax, which is within the range
reported by Fama and French (2002) between 1951 and 2000: 4.74% using the dividend growth
model and 6.51% using the earnings growth model. Our approach means that we treat payout
policy as exogenous and do not allow for supply-side adjustments to changes in tax policy (e.g.,
Black (1976), Chetty and Saez (2005)). The parameter assumptions are supported by data. The
pooled cross-section and time-series average dividend yield in our sample is 3.6%. The time-series
begins at 5.3% in 1950 and ends at 2.3% in 2006.13 The geometric average real GDP growth rate
in the pooled sample is 2.9%. The average is in°uenced by high real growth rates after World War
II, especially in Germany and Japan, so we assume that investors expect lower real stock price
growth.
3.3.3 Demographic Parameters
The numerical value of the tax bene¯t to income smoothing depends on demographic parameters.
We assume that an individual begins contributing to a pension plan at the age of 25 and retires
13Substantially lower dividend yields in the United States and United Kingdom after 1982 can partially be explained
by a dramatic increase in popularity of share repurchases following changes in regulation favoring these repurchases.
Since share repurchases are taxed di®erently from dividends, we do not include them in our calculations.
18at the age of 65. Retirement at 65 has long been the norm in the countries we study. It was
chosen in the social security system of the United Kingdom in 1925 and in the United States in
1935. We assume that households use life-expectancy statistics to predict the number of years
in retirement. For each country in our sample, we collect life-expectancy conditional on the age
of 25 and compute the cross-country average. The time-series of average life expectancy begins
at 70.4 years in 1950 and ends at 81.4 years in 2006. These assumptions imply that the number
of work years is N = 40 and the number of retirement years is M 2 [6:4;16:4]. The number of
retirement years is an approximately linearly increasing function of time. The importance of saving
for retirement increases over time.
4 Evolution of Household Taxation of Stocks
Dividends are taxed as ordinary income, but many tax codes o®er a dividend-tax relief to reduce
the e®ects of double taxation of corporate income. Canada introduced a dividend-tax credit in
1949, Japan in 1950, France in 1965, United Kingdom in 1973, Germany in 1977, and Finland
in 1993 under tax codes which are often referred to as reduced-rate or imputation-tax systems.
Furthermore, the tax codes of Sweden 1991, Finland 1993, United Kingdom 1999, and United
States 2003 di®erentiate between ordinary income and investment income and subject dividend
income to lower marginal tax rates. These tax systems are usually referred to as dual-income
systems. The tax code of Japan 1965 combines all of these features.
The United States begins taxing capital gains on stocks in 1916. Some other sample countries
begin taxing capital gains on stocks relatively late: the United Kingdom in 1965 and Canada in
1972. Sweden begins taxing short-term capital gains in 1910 and Finland in 1920, but long-term
capital gains are tax exempt before 1967 in Sweden and 1986 in Finland. In Germany, France, and
Japan, long-term capital gains on stocks are e®ectively tax exempt throughout the time period we
study.
194.1 Marginal Tax Rates
The sequence of plots contained in Figure 4 shows the evolution of marginal tax rates. In all plots,
the solid line above is the top statutory rate on ordinary income and the dashed line below is the
top statutory rate on dividends. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory tax rate (solid line)
are the top income tax brackets expressed as multiples of GDP per capita. Below the top statutory
rates, we plot our proxies for the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and capital gains
(triangles) of our representative GDP5 household.
The top panel of Figure 4a shows the evolution of marginal tax rates in the United States. We
assume that state tax is a constant 5%, which is close to the average top statutory rate. The top
statutory rate on ordinary income equals the top statutory rate on dividends between 1950 and
2002. Since 2003, dividends are taxed at a lower top statutory rate. This change in the tax code
is represented by the dashed line. Top statutory income rates decrease from above 90% in the
1950s to below 40% in 2006. In 1950, the GDP-per-capita multiple is 222 and thus relevant to few
households. The multiple decreases rapidly to 18 in 1980. After TRA 1986, the income multiple
stays around eight. The marginal tax rate on dividends for the GDP5 household (diamonds) stays
around 30% in the 1950s and 1960s, it increases rapidly in the 1970s, and drops back to the 30%
level after TRA 1986. These changes occur because tax tables are ¯xed and nominal income growth
pushes households into higher tax brackets. The bracket creep of the 1970s becomes an important
part of Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign and results in TRA 1986 with the formal indexation
of tax tables. The capital gains tax rate (triangles) is approximately constant around 10%.
The eight tax plots share several common features. In the ¯rst decade after World War II,
high top statutory rates on personal income are coupled with low marginal tax rates for the GDP5
household. In the subsequent decades, marginal tax rates drift upwards (bracket creep), and the
GDP-per-capita multiple at the top statutory rate decreases from an average well above 100 in
1950 to around 10 in 1980. In the extreme cases of Sweden and Finland (Figure 4c), the marginal
tax rates of the GDP5 household are equal to the top statutory rates in the 1970s and 1980s, and
the top statutory rate applies to an income multiple of only two. The bracket creep ends with
TRA 1986 and similar tax reforms in other countries: the United Kingdom 1988, Japan 1989,
































































The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita. In Japan, the marginal tax rate depends
on the size of the dividend from each company. Case I, II, and III refer to a large, an intermediate,
and a small dividend, respectively.






























































The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.






























































The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.



























































The ¯gure shows the top statutory tax rate (solid line), the top statutory rate on dividends (dashed
line), the marginal tax rate on dividends (diamonds) and long-term capital gains (triangles) of the
representative GDP5 household. The numbers adjacent to the top statutory rate are the top income
tax brackets expressed in multiples of GDP per capita.
24Sweden 1991, and Finland 1993. In all countries, the marginal tax rates of the GDP5 household
become equal to top statutory rates after TRA 1986, but top statutory rates are much lower than
in the past.
4.2 Bracket Creep
A quantitative measure of bracket creep can be constructed as real tax liability on nominal income
as a fraction of tax liability on real income:
CREEP =
T(Y (1 + i))=(1 + i)
T(Y )
¡ 1: (7)
The measure assumes that households and governments are passive. The left of Figure 5 plots the



























The ¯gure shows the annual bracket creep measured as real tax liability on nominal income over
tax liability on real income in percent. It is evaluated at the income level ¯ve times GDP per capita
(CREEP5).
time-series of CREEP5 for the United States. The measure peaks at approximately 6%, which
means that real tax liability increases by six percentage point in a single year. The cumulative real
tax increase between 1973 and 1982 amounts to the stunning amount of 40% of personal income.
Of course, an implicit tax increase of this order of magnitude does not materialize. Tax tables
are adjusted in 1977-1979 and 1982, and formal in°ation indexation is adopted with TRA 1986.14
14Personal tax tables change infrequently from World War II to the 1970s. Regular adjustments of personal tax
tables begins in France 1969, Canada 1972, United Kingdom and Finland 1977, and Sweden 1979. Germany and
25Households do not stay passive either. They respond by bargaining for pensions over wages, selling
stocks to ¯nance consumption, buying municipal bonds, increasing tax-deductible mortgages, etc.
The time-series for Germany are seen to the right of Figure 5. Bracket creep is relatively mild
in Germany because in°ation is kept under tight control. Consequently, German tax tables are
never indexed. The CREEP plots for the United Kingdom and Japan resemble United States, and
the plots for Canada, France, Sweden, and Finland are similar to Germany. Bracket creep is less
pronounced in Canada, France, Sweden, and Finland because, at the time of the in°ation of the
1970s, the GDP5 household already pays the top statutory rate on most of his income, i.e., e®ective
tax rates are close to top statutory rates.
4.3 Tax Bene¯ts of Pensions
The sample average GAP5 is about two percent. It ranges from 1% in Germany to 2.8% in the
United Kingdom. A two percent expected return di®erence matters over long investment horizons.
For example, suppose one dollar per year is put into a savings account over 40 years. The future
value of the savings account at 2% interest rate is $60 compared to $40, which is the future value
of a savings account that accrues without interest. Figure 6 shows the evolution of GAP5 in each
of the eight sample countries. GAP5 varies both over time and cross-sectionally. GAP5 reaches
particularly high levels in the United Kingdom and Sweden with high in°ation and extreme levels
of dividend income taxation, but the level of GAP5 does not fall far behind in the United States.
In the United Kingdom, GAP5 peaks at nearly 6%, which implies that, under our assumptions, the
expected real rate of return on stocks after tax is approximately zero.15 Shareholders in Canada,
France, Germany, and Japan are partly protected from bracket creep by the dividend tax credit.
In countries with tax on long-term capital gains, notably the United States, Sweden, and United
Kingdom, GAP5 peaks during the high-in°ation period of the 1970s. In countries where long-term
capital gains are exempt from tax, notably France, Germany, and Japan, GAP5 is relatively low
Japan do not follow the general pattern and change their personal tax tables infrequently throughout the post-war
period.
15Expected real rates of return outside the retirement account are not negative under the assumed parameter values
because real stock price growth is high (g = 2%) and the marginal tax rate on capital gains is low as a result of
deferral and low statutory rates on long-term capital gains.








































































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
The ¯gure shows the real rate of return di®erence between saving inside and outside a pension plan
for a household with an income multiple of ¯ve times GDP per capita (GAP5). The numbers are
expressed in percent. We assume that the expected dividend yield is d = 4%, expected real growth
is g = 2%, and that expected in°ation equals the three-year moving average. We also assume that
the e®ective capital gains tax rate equals 50% of the long-term statutory rate.
27over time. A visual comparison of the GAP5 plots with those of household ownership in Figure 2a
and 2b suggests a strong correlation between changes in stock ownership structure and GAP5. In
the United States, United Kingdom and Sweden, the fraction of household ownership decreases fast
when GAP5 climbs to high levels in the 1970s, while in Japan and Germany, there is not much
time-series variation in either the fraction of household ownership or GAP5.
















1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
The ¯gure shows the tax bene¯t to income smoothing for a household with an income multiple of ¯ve times GDP
per capita (SMOOTH5). The numbers are expressed in percent.
The averages of the three measures of SMOOTH5 are positive because personal tax tables are
progressive. The average annual reduction in the tax bill is 7.3%. This number is quite small given
that it is derived under the assumption that income smoothing is implemented optimally over the
individual's life time.16 More carefully calibrated parameters with income growth and borrowing
constraints do not raise SMOOTH5 much above this number. Figure 7 shows the evolution of
SMOOTH5, measured as the reduction of the tax bill, in the United States and Japan. In the
United States, the bene¯t from income smoothing increases during the 1970s and peaks near 15%,
while it is relatively stable in Japan. The paths of SMOOTH5 in the other six countries are
relatively °at. The correlation coe±cient between GAP5 and SMOOTH5 is small.
16Two closely-related measures of SMOOTH are an increase in disposable income,
(ÁY ¡T(ÁY ))=Á
Y ¡T(Y ) ¡1, and a reduction
in the e®ective tax rate, ¹ ¿(Y ) ¡ ¹ ¿(ÁY ). These measures average to 4.8% and 2.7%, respectively.
285 Household Ownership and the Tax Bene¯ts of Pensions
Our objective is to estimate households' aggregate response to the tax incentives to save inside a
pension plan. The response variable is the change in the fraction of household ownership ¢y. The
incentive variables are GAP5 and SMOOTH5. We estimate the pooled cross-section and time-series
regression model:
¢yit = a + b ¢ GAP5it + c ¢ SMOOTH5it + eit; (8)
and test whether the slope coe±cients are negative: b;c < 0. We do not include lagged variables
because the incentives to save inside a pension plan are slow-moving variables. Any delayed response
is likely to be highly correlated with the current values of the incentive variables. Life expectancy
and, therefore, the need to save for retirement increases at a steady rate over time. The e®ect of
this trend variable is captured by the regression intercept. The regression can be estimated with the
eight-country panel data set. The estimation procedure corrects for ¯rst-order autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity.17 The time series of ownership are incomplete for the United Kingdom, Sweden,
and Finland, particularly in the beginning of the sample period. Missing values are replaced by
linearly interpolated data.
Table 2 reports our main results. Speci¯cation (1) ignores the tax variables and reports only the
average annual change in household ownership across the eight countries. The average decline in the
fraction of household ownership is 0.92% per year. Speci¯cations (2){(4) include the tax variables.
The coe±cient of GAP5 is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, while the coe±cient of SMOOTH5 is
not. Once we include the tax variables, the intercept term is not statistically di®erent from zero.
The magnitude of the regression coe±cient of GAP5 means that a three percentage point di®erence
between saving inside and outside a pension plan results in an annual reduction of the fraction of
household ownership by one percentage point. When we break down GAP5 into its components
(Speci¯cations (3) and (4)), we see that both terms and the marginal tax rates on dividends and
capital gains have explanatory power. These results suggest that both dividend tax and capital
gains tax matter.
17In Table 2, we allow the autocorrelation coe±cient to be country speci¯c, while in Table 3 we use the same
autocorrelation coe±cient for all countries. The pooled autocorrelation coe±cient is 0.133.
29Table 2: Pooled Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant {0.92 {0.21 {0.15 0.27
({11.3)







Capital gains term {28.2
({2.4)
¤¤
Dividend tax rate {2.0
({5.8)
¤¤¤
Capital gains tax rate {1.7
({1.8)
¤
SMOOTH5 1.4 1.3 {2.8
(0.6) (0.6) ({1.1)
R
2 0.000 0.043 0.044 0.039
#Obs 395 392 392 392
The table reports the results of regressing the households' annual percentage ownership change on proxy vari-
ables for the tax bene¯ts of saving inside a pension plan de¯ned by equations (5) and (6). The proxy variables
are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the income ¯ve times GDP per capita. The regres-
sions are estimated with generalized least squares and take into account within-country auto-correlation and




¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null
hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
Table 3: Decade-by-Decade Regressions
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
Constant {0.38 {0.59 0.21 {0.31 {1.80
({0.4) ({1.3) (0.9) ({0.6) ({2.5)
¤¤





SMOOTH5 {13.5 7.6 0.8 2.7 8.5
({1.0) (1.8) (0.2) (0.6) (2.1)
R
2 0.158 0.210 0.090 0.100 0.027
#Obs 37 68 72 80 80
The table reports the regression results decade by decade. The dependent variable is the households' annual
percentage ownership change and the independent variables are proxy variables for the tax bene¯ts of saving
inside a retirement account. The proxy variables are functions of marginal tax rates that are evaluated at the
income ¯ve times GDP per capita. The regressions are estimated as in Table 2. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses below the coe±cients. Asterisk
¤,
¤¤, and
¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better,
respectively, against the null hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
30Table 3 reports the results of estimating the regression model (8) decade by decade. We report
only the results using GAP5 and SMOOTH5 as regressors. The coe±cient of GAP5 is statistically
di®erent from zero in the three regressions covering the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but not otherwise.
These results demonstrate that the explanatory power of the regression model (8) is due to cross-
section variation in marginal tax rates during the high-in°ation period before TRA 1986. The
intercept is statistically di®erent from zero in the 1990s regression. It suggests that non-tax forces
reduce the fraction of household ownership in recent years.
We carry out many robustness checks. The pooled regression model (8) assumes that the
underlying time trend is equal in all countries. When we allow the underlying time trend to
vary (i.e., country-¯xed e®ects), we get similar regression coe±cients.18 We also examine the
regression model's sensitivity to varying the model parameters of GAP and SMOOTH. The results
are summarized in Table 4. In Speci¯cations (1) and (2), we evaluate the tax variables at the income
level GDP1 and the top statutory rate, respectively. Evaluating the tax variables at other income
multiples from GDP2 to GDP15 or at the average statutory rate produce regression coe±cients
that fall between these two extremes. The explanatory power of GAP is not a®ected, while the
coe±cients of SMOOTH remain insigni¯cant. We also vary the ¯nancial parameters keeping the
tax parameters constant (evaluated at GDP5). Speci¯cation (3) assumes that both the dividend
yield and the capital gains yield are zero. The stripped-down GAP variable measures the impact
of capital gains tax on in°ation. Intermediate combinations of positive dividend yields and capital
gains growth rates generate similar results. Speci¯cation (4) models expected dividend yield as a
three-year moving average keeping all other assumptions the same. Again, the explanatory power
of GAP is una®ected.
The regression results are robust to varying the model parameters because none of the alter-
natives change the ordering of high-tax versus low-tax countries during the high-in°ation period
before TRA 1986. The fraction of household ownership decreases fast in the United States, United
Kingdom, and Sweden, where marginal tax rates are high, and the fraction of household owner-
ship decreases slowly in Germany and Japan where marginal tax rates are low. Since the country
18Out of all eight countries, only the coe±cient of the dummy variable for Canada is statistically di®erent from
zero.
31Table 4: Robustness Checks
Tax parameters Financial parameters No parameters
GDP1 Top rate Zero yield Moving Dummy
average variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)












SMOOTH {1.1 {1.8 2.5 1.7





















2 0.044 0.035 0.022 0.031 0.046
#Obs 391 392 392 361 395
The table reports the results of varying the model parameters or GAP and SMOOTH. (1) The tax variables are
evaluated at an income multiple of one times GDP per capita. (2) The tax variables are evaluated at the top
statutory rate. (3) The tax variables are evaluated at zero dividend yield and zero capital gains yield. (4) The tax
variables are evaluated at the three-year moving average dividend yield. (5) Country dummy variables interacted




¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance level 10%, 5%, and 1% or better, respectively, against the null
hypothesis that the coe±cient is zero.
32ordering is preserved, only the magnitude of the regression coe±cients, and not the statistical sig-
ni¯cance, changes across the alternative speci¯cations. The regression to the far right in Table 4
supports this interpretation. Speci¯cation (5) is a regression where the dummy variable for each
country is interacted with an indicator variable which equals one for 1970{1989 and zero otherwise.
The fraction of household ownership decreases in all countries. However, the fraction of household
ownership decreases faster in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden in 1970{1989 than in
other countries or other time periods. The tax variables pick up this time-series and cross-country
correlation. Any non-tax explanation must account for this particular pattern.
6 Alternative Explanations
Allen and Santomero (1998) hypothesize that households respond to increasing participation costs
by shifting from direct to indirect stock ownership. Possible proxy variables for participation costs
include stock market turnover, idiosyncratic volatility, cross-border ownership, and the opening of
stock options and stock futures markets. Stock market turnover may be a consequence of dynamic
risk management strategies, the level of idiosyncratic volatility measures the number of stocks
that are required to diversify a stock portfolio, cross-border investing requires more expertise than
purchasing domestic stocks, and the use of derivatives for risk management requires a certain level
of sophistication. The four proxy variables for participation costs reach their time-series high in the
1990s and 2000s after most shares have already shifted from households to ¯nancial institutions.
Time-series of stock market turnover in the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden begin
a long-term increase starting around 1980 with the fastest increase taking place recently. For
example, in the United States, annual stock market turnover is 20% from 1950{1980, 50% from
1980-1989, and 100% from 1990-2006 (French (2008)). Idiosyncratic volatility is a slow-moving
variable which increases at a constant rate over time (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)).
The foreign ownership fraction increases rapidly in all countries after 1990 (see Table 1). Markets
for standardized stock options open in the United States 1973, United Kingdom 1982, France and
Sweden 1985, and Germany 1990.
Commentators of earlier versions of this paper have suggested a learning explanation of the
33observed evolution of aggregate stock ownership. Suppose that directly-held stock portfolios are
undiversi¯ed, and that professionally-managed portfolios are well diversi¯ed. Then, stock ownership
shares migrate from households to ¯nancial intermediaries as households learn about the low-cost
diversi¯cation alternative o®ered by ¯nancial intermediaries. Ownership data from the Survey of
Consumer Finances, brokerage accounts, and the Swedish share registry verify that directly-held
stock portfolios are undiversi¯ed,19 and institutional ownership data from 13(f) ¯lings suggest that
institutional stock portfolios include many stocks. However, serious objections can be raised that
make us doubt the validity of the explanation. First, learning may contribute to the underlying
time trend in the aggregate stock ownership data, but it does not explain the di®erent country
paths, or why pension funds grow after World War II and why mutual funds grow after the enact-
ment of 401(k). Second, the argument requires that the amount invested in directly-held stocks is
large relative to total household wealth including human capital, residential real estate, retirement
accounts, and claims on the social security system. Otherwise, shifting a small amount into a
mutual fund portfolio has a negligible e®ect.
Labor economist have proposed a number of non-tax bene¯ts of de¯ned bene¯t plans that may
contribute to the growth of pension funds (see the survey by Bernheim (2002) for references).
De¯ned bene¯t plans may a®ect productivity, since de¯ned bene¯t formula makes it costly for
workers to leave employment too early or to quit employment too late. Moreover, private annuity
markets are believed to su®er from adverse selection because people who expect to live long choose
to purchase life annuity contracts and thereby raise the insurance cost for people with shorter life
expectancy. A mandatory de¯ned bene¯t plan such as the social security system can o®er fairly
priced life annuities. Given these potential e®ects on labor productivity and risk sharing in the
economy, Bernheim (2002) concludes that the tax bene¯ts of private pensions do not imply that
\the growth of the pension system is exclusively, or even primarily attributable to the tax system."
However, the moral hazard and adverse selection arguments apply mainly to de¯ned bene¯t plans
and cannot explain the growth of de¯ned contribution plans post-401(k). Also, as pointed out by
Ippolito (1986), there is no reason to believe that moral hazard and adverse selection suddenly
19See, e.g., Polkovnichenko (2005), Goetzman and Kumar (2008), Dahlquist, Robertsson, and Rydqvist (2009).
34become important after World War II. Life annuities appear in the United States in 1772, and the
legislation of annuities dates back to the late 1930s after the beginning of the social security system
in 1935.
7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the long-term decreasing trend in household direct ownership of stocks
and the corresponding long-term increase in intermediated stock ownership. We have provided
panel-data evidence from eight countries that changes in the fraction of household ownership is
correlated with proxy variables for marginal tax rates. Ownership in the eight sample countries
follow di®erent paths depending on features of the tax code and exposure to in°ation in the 1970s
and the 1980s. As in°ation takes o®, the fraction of household ownership decreases fast in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden where marginal tax rates are high and long-term
capital gains are taxed. At the same time, the fraction of household ownership decreases slowly in
Germany and Japan with tight monetary policy and no tax on long-term capital gains.
The implications of these results for tax policy, research, and teaching are outlined at the
end of the Introduction. We conclude the paper with suggestions for future research. The tax
theory of pension funds may explain the growth and prevalence of inter-corporate ownership in
many countries. For example, we see in Table 1 above that inter-corporate ownership increases in
Sweden when marginal tax rates increase. Do ¯rms in Sweden, Germany, and Japan hold stock
portfolios to hedge pension liabilities on the books? Furthermore, we have argued that households
respond to tax incentives by shifting from direct to indirect stock ownership. Do we see similar
portfolio adjustments in aggregate ownership data of bonds and real estate? The cross-country
panel approach used in this paper may provide a useful tool to study these and related tax questions
that otherwise are restricted to studying the e®ects of a handful tax reforms.
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388 Appendix: Personal Taxation of Stocks
This appendix explains the principles of personal taxation of income from stocks in the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Finland. We do not cover
the taxation of corporate income except where it is needed to understand personal taxation of
dividends. The following general notation is used:
¿d = personal tax rate on dividend income.
¿r = reduction rate on dividend income.
¿i = imputation rate on dividend income.
¿g = personal tax rate on capital gains.
¿p = personal tax rate on ordinary income.
¿pi = personal tax rate on investment income.
¿pc = central personal tax rate.
¿ps = sub-central personal tax rate.
¿sc = central surtax rate on personal tax.
¿ss = sub-central surtax rate on personal tax.
The precise meaning of each tax rate is explained in its context below. Many tax systems are
covered and additional notation is introduced as needed. The statutory tax rates are not reported
here, but can be requested from the authors.
8.1 United States
Personal income is subject to federal, state, and city taxes. When there is a choice (since 1949), we
choose the federal tax tables for a married couple ¯ling jointly. We adjust for state tax by assuming
it is a time-series constant ¿ps = 5%, but we ignore city tax. The assumption for the state tax rate
is based on the equally-weighted average top statutory state tax rates in 1950, 1987, and 2006. The
information is taken from Sagoo (2005).
398.1.1 Dividends
From 1913{2002, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. State taxes are deductible at the federal
level, so the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
¿d = ¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (9)
In 2003, the United States switches to a dual-income system, where ordinary income and investment
income are taxed as separate income classes. The federal tax schedule on dividends is simpler, it
involves only two steps, and peaks well below the top personal rate:
¿d = ¿pi(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (10)
8.1.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1916. From 1916{1933, realized capital gains on stocks
are taxed as ordinary income. From 1922{1933, the capital gains tax rate is capped at 12.5%. From
1934{1986, a portion ¼ of long-term capital gains is taxed:
¿g = ¼ £ [¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps]: (11)
The federal capital gains tax rate is capped at 30% (1938{1941) and 25% (1942{1969). The cap is
removed in 1972{1986. There is a Vietnam war capital gains surtax ¿gs in 1968{1970:
¿g = ¼ £ [¿pc(1 + ¿sc)(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps]: (12)
Since 1987, long-term capital gains are taxed as a separate income class:
¿g = ¿pi(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps: (13)
408.2 Canada
A distinguishing feature of the Canadian tax system is that provincial (sub-central) tax rates are
de¯ned as proportions of federal (central) taxes. Hence, central and sub-central tax rates are
multiplied with each other, which means that the provincial tax is a tax on the federal tax. We
approximate the provincial tax with the rates from Ontario. Our main data sources are Revenue
Canada (1950{2006), Perry (1989), and Perry (1990).
8.2.1 Dividends
We begin with the Canadian tax system in 1949{1971. A tax credit is provided at the central level
for sub-central taxes. Let ¿rs denote the sub-central reduction rate. The personal tax rate net of
the sub-central tax credit equals:
¿p = ¿pc + (¿ps ¡ ¿rs)¿pc: (14)
Dividends are taxed as personal income, but Canada o®ers a dividend-tax relief at rate ¿r. Dividend
income is taxed at the rate:
¿d = ¿pc ¡ ¿r (central tax)
+ (¿ps ¡ ¿rs) £ (¿pc ¡ ¿r) (sub-central tax)
(15)
This expression corrects Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnston (1984), who
include the sub-central tax credit, but fail to include the sub-central tax.
We proceed with the tax system in 1972{1999. There are two important changes. First, an
imputation-tax credit at rate ¿i replaces the dividend-reduction rate ¿r. The dividend tax and the
imputation-tax credit are levied on the grossed-up dividend 1 + g. Second, the sub-central tax
credit is abandoned and, later, surtaxes are added at both the central and the sub-central level.
41The surtaxes are de¯ned as proportions of other taxes. Dividend income is taxed at rate:
¿d = [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿ps (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿ps £ ¿ss (sub-central surtax)
(16)
This expression can be simpli¯ed to:
¿d = (1 + g)(¿pc ¡ ¿i)[1 + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss) + ¿sc]: (17)
The personal tax rate is simpler as there is no imputation-tax credit:
¿p = ¿pc [1 + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss) + ¿sc]: (18)
Next, we explain the Canadian tax system as of 2000{2005. This tax reform changes the sub-
central tax. Instead of a tax on tax, the sub-central tax becomes a tax on income. Surtaxes remain
to be tax on tax. A new sub-central dividend credit at rate ¿rs is also introduced:
¿d = [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] (central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿pc ¡ (1 + g)¿i] £ ¿sc (central surtax)
+ [(1 + g)¿ps ¡ (1 + g)¿rs] (sub-central tax)
+ [(1 + g)¿ps ¡ (1 + g)¿rs] £ ¿ss (sub-central surtax)
(19)
Essentially, the federal and provincial taxes are calculated separately and then summed together.
The expression simpli¯es to:
¿d = (1 + g)[(¿pc ¡ ¿i)(1 + ¿sc) + (¿ps ¡ ¿rs)(1 + ¿ss)]: (20)
42Again, the personal tax rate is simpler:
¿p = ¿pc(1 + ¿sc) + ¿ps(1 + ¿ss): (21)
Finally, there is a change in the taxation of dividends in 2006 that we ignore because stock ownership
data and GDP per capita are not yet available for 2006.
8.2.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1972. The principles have not changed as of 2006. A
proportion of long-term capital gains ¼ is taxed as ordinary income:
¿g = ¼ £ ¿p: (22)
From 1986{1989, households earn a life-time capital gains exemption for the sale of all property
including real estate. Although the exemption amount is quite large, we ignore this provision.
8.3 United Kingdom
Income taxes are collected at the central level only, so we do not need to worry about sub-central
taxes. The main information and data sources are Orhnial and Foldes (1975), King (1977), and
the HM Revenue & Customs website.
8.3.1 Dividends
From 1947{1964, the United Kingdom has a tax system which can be characterized as a hybrid
of two business taxation models. One component conforms to the classical model of corporate
taxation with double taxation except that there are di®erent tax rates for distributed and retained
pro¯ts. Speci¯cally, the corporation pays corporate tax at rate ¿cd on distributed pro¯ts and rate
¿cr on retained pro¯ts, where ¿cd ¸ ¿cr. Shareholders in higher income brackets pay personal tax on
dividends at rate ¿p ¡ ¿pst, where ¿pst is the standard rate of income tax. The other component of
the hybrid system conforms to the standard model of partnership taxation, where business income
43passes through and is taxed as personal income. Speci¯cally, shareholders pay tax on corporate
income at the standard rate of income tax ¿pst irrespective of whether corporate income is paid out
or retained. This tax is paid in addition to personal tax on dividends.
In the hybrid system, the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the personal rate. To
see this, we decompose pre-tax corporate income Y into after-tax dividend D, after-tax retained
earnings RET, paid corporate taxes on dividends, and paid corporate taxes on retained earnings:
Y = D + ¿cdD + RET + ¿crRET: (23)
From 1947{1951, an individual shareholder is liable for personal tax in the amount:
(¿p ¡ ¿pst)D + ¿pstD + ¿pstRET: (24)
The ¯rst term is personal income tax on dividends (¯rst component of the hybrid system). The
second and the third terms are personal tax on corporate income (second component). From this
expression, we can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals:
¿d = (¿p ¡ ¿pst) + ¿pst = ¿p: (25)
From 1952{1964, the corporate tax deductability is removed and shareholders are also liable for
personal tax on paid corporate taxes:
(¿p ¡ ¿pst)D + ¿pstD + ¿pstRET + ¿pst(¿cdD + ¿crRET): (26)
We can see that the marginal tax rate on dividend income equals the marginal tax rate on personal
income as in (25).
In 1965{1972, the United Kingdom switches to a classical tax system. Dividends are taxed as
personal income at rate ¿d = ¿p. A few years later, in 1973{1998, the United Kingdom switches to
an imputation-tax system with a signi¯cant dividend-tax relief. The tax and the imputation-tax






The imputation rate is de¯ned as the standard rate of income tax, which means that only households
in higher income brackets pay tax on dividends. From 1973{1984, dividend income above an
exclusion amount is subject to investment income surcharge at rate 15% on top of the ordinary
income tax rate for high-income earners. We ignore the surcharge in our calculations because the
exclusion amount is large.
Since 1999, the United Kingdom combines the imputation-tax system with a dual-income system






Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1965. From 1965{1987, the United Kingdom practices a
dual-income system where realized capital gains are subject to a proportional rate after an initial
exempt amount. From 1988{2006, realized capital gains are taxed as ordinary income except for
an initial exempt amount. From 1982{1997, the cost basis is indexed for in°ation. The gap plot
for the United Kingdom in Figure 6 is corrected for indexing.
8.3.3 Pensions
From 1973{1997, untaxed investors also earn a tax refund on dividends (see Bell and Jenkinson








d + g; (29)










Taxes are collected at the central level, but the revenues from speci¯c taxes are reserved for the
sub-central administration. The central tax is referred to as national tax and the sub-central taxes
as prefectural tax and municipal tax, respectively. From 1953{1961, municipalities are o®ered the
choice among three di®erent tax schedules. We focus on option b which becomes the standard from
1962. The main data sources are Ishi (2001) and Tax Bureau of Finance (1953{2005). We are
missing the tax tables from 1949{1952.
8.4.1 Dividends
Dividend income is taxed as personal income subject to central tax rate ¿pc and sub-central tax
rate ¿ps (prefectural and municipal tax). Both the central and the sub-central tax schedules are
progressive. From 1950{2006, Japan o®ers a dividend-tax credit in the form of a rate reduction.
The central reduction rate is ¿rc and the sub-central reduction rate ¿rs. The marginal tax rate on
dividend income equals:
¿d = ¿pc + ¿ps ¡ ¿rc ¡ ¿rs: (31)
The reduction rates are lower for higher dividend income (two income brackets). In our calculations,
we choose the reduction rate for the lower income level because the higher income tax bracket is
high (annual dividend income above JPY 10 million). The marginal tax rates on personal income
¿pc + ¿ps is capped from 1961{1988:
¿d = min[¿pc + ¿ps;¿cap] ¡ ¿rc ¡ ¿rs; (32)
i.e., the dividend-tax reduction is earned in full after the cap is imposed.
From 1965{2006, the marginal tax rate on dividends depends on the dividend amount earned
from each stock in the portfolio. Therefore, the marginal tax rate does not only depend on household
income but also on portfolio composition and dividend yield. The dividend is small, intermediate, or
large depending on whether the dividend on the stock falls below, between, or exceeds JPY 50,000
and 250,000, respectively. In 1973, the cuto®s are doubled. From 1965{1988, large dividends are
46taxed according to (31). This tax treatment referred to as Case I in Figure 4a and the text above.
For intermediate dividends, the shareholder can choose between personal taxation (31) and the
following simpli¯ed procedure:
¿d = ¿pi + ¿ps ¡ ¿rs: (33)
Under the option, a proportional investment tax ¿pi replaces the central tax schedule ¿pc and reduc-
tion ¿rc. The option is referred to as Case II above. Finally, for small dividends, the shareholder can
choose between personal taxation (31) and not reporting the dividend income on the tax return.
In the latter case, the shareholder ends up paying the proportional withholding tax collected at
source. This is referred to as Case III above.
8.4.2 Capital Gains
Before 1953, capital gains on stocks are taxed as ordinary income. From 1953{1988, stocks are
exempt from capital gains tax. Capital gains tax on stocks is reintroduced in 1989. For long-term
capital gains de¯ned by the minimum holding period of one year, shareholders are given a choice.
First, the investor can choose to not report the capital gain. In this case, the capital gains tax
equals the withholding tax of 1% of the sales price. Second, if the investor chooses to report the
capital gain on the tax return, it is subject to a proportional investment income tax (national tax
and local inhabitants tax). We ignore capital gains tax in our calculations.
8.5 Germany
Personal income is taxed at the central level only. We choose the tax schedule for a married
couple ¯ling jointly. From 1958{2006, there is only one tax schedule. Then, the tax for a married
couple equals two times the tax on half the income, so the marginal tax rate for a married couple
with income equal to GDP5 equals the marginal tax rate of a single ¯ler with income equal to
GDP2.5. The main data sources are BÄ orsch-Supan (1994), Corneo (2005), and the German Tax
Administration. We use the 1954 tax table for 1955 and 1956, which are missing.
478.5.1 Dividends
Dividends are taxed as personal income. A special feature of the German tax code since 1958 is
that the marginal tax rate is determined by a combination of a step function and a continuous
function. The marginal tax rate is a constant in the lowest and the highest income brackets, and
it is determined by a polynomial function in the intermediate income brackets:
















where Y denotes taxable income and fa;b1;b2;b3;c;dg are parameters which vary over time. The
polynomial function has three terms in 1958{1974, four terms in 1975{1989 (as shown), and two
terms in 1990{2006 (linear function).
From 1977{2001, Germany has an imputation-tax system that works as in the United King-
dom (27). From 2002{2006, Germany switches to a partial-inclusion system, where a proportion ¼
of the dividend is taxable income:
¿d = ¼ £ ¿p: (35)










(1 + ¿sc) , in 1990{2001;
¼¿p(1 + ¿sc) , in 2002{2006:
(36)
From 1950{2006, there is also a church tax which also enters like a multiplicative surtax. We
ignore this tax. The church tax is optional (one can opt out of the church), the e®ective tax rate
is relatively small in the order of 1-2%, and it varies geographically.
8.5.2 Capital Gains
Long-term capital gains de¯ned by a minimum holding period of six months before 1998 and 12
months from 1998 are exempt from capital gains tax.
488.6 France
Taxes are collected at the central level only. We ignore surtaxes in our calculations. The main data
sources are Fougµ ere (1994) and Piketty (2001).
8.6.1 Dividends
From 1950-1959, dividends are taxed at source at rate ¿w. The net dividend is taxed as personal
income:
¿d = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¿p)(1 ¡ ¿w): (37)
From 1960-1964, dividends are taxed as personal income. The withholding tax is fully deductible:
¿d = ¿p: (38)
From 1965-2004, France has a standard imputation-tax system that o®ers a partial credit for
corporate taxes on distributed pro¯ts as in (27). In 2005-2006, France replaces the imputation-tax
system with a partial-inclusion system where a proportion ¼ of the dividend is taxed as personal
income as in (35).
8.6.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1976. Capital gains are taxed as a separate income class
subject to a low proportional rate. A relatively large amount is exempt, so we assume that the
capital gains tax is e®ectively zero.
8.7 Sweden
Personal income is subject to national tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central).
We use the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the prefectural tax and the church tax, which
are relatively small. We also ignore a social security tax (Folkpensionsavgift, 1936-1973), which
is based on ordinary income including investment income. The social security tax is capped and
rather small at higher income levels. When there is a choice (1953{1970), we use the national tax
49rates for a married couple ¯ling jointly. The main data sources are SÄ oderberg (1996), Statistics
Sweden, and the Swedish Tax Administration.
8.7.1 Dividends






¿pc(1 ¡ ¿ps) + ¿ps , in 1948{1970;
¿pc + ¿ps , in 1971{1990:
(39)
The combined marginal tax rate is capped in 1980{1985. In 1991, Sweden introduces a dual-income
system, where ordinary income is subject to a progressive schedule and dividend income is taxed
as investment income subject to a lower proportional rate:
¿d = ¿pi: (40)
8.7.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1910. From 1910{1951, short-term capital gains as de¯ned
by a holding period of less than ¯ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1952{1976, a portion ¼ of short-term capital gains is taxed as ordinary
income as in (22). The portion depends on the holding period:
¼ =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
100% , if 0{2 years;
75% , if 2{3 years;
50% , if 3{4 years;
25% , if 4{5 years;
0% , if >5 years:
(41)
50From 1967{1976, 10% of the sales price of a security held more than ¯ve years is taxed as ordinary





100% , if 0{2 years;
40% , if >2 years:
(42)
From 1991{2006, all capital gains are taxed as investment income:
¿g = ¿pi: (43)
The tax rule in e®ect 1967{1976 removes the basis from the calculation of the long-term capital
gain. As above, let g denote nominal stock price growth rate. The statutory marginal tax rate on




(1 + g)N ¡ 1
!
: (44)
This expression shows that the e®ect on the marginal tax rate from the loss of the basis is small
over long investment horizons, especially when expected stock price growth is high. The value of
the basis protection disappears in the limit as N goes to in¯nity. In the analysis above, we assume
that N = 15, g = 2% + i, where i equals three-year moving average in°ation.
8.7.3 Pensions
From 1991{2006, imputed income from pension asset management de¯ned as the average treasury
rate during the previous year times the value of the pension assets in the beginning of the year is
taxed at the proportional rate 15%. We denote the expected treasury rate with rf and measure it
as 1% plus moving average in°ation. Equation (5) becomes:
GAP =




Income taxation in Finland resembles Sweden in many ways. Personal income is subject to national
tax (central), municipal tax, and church tax (sub-central). We approximate the sub-central tax
rate with the average municipal tax rate, but we ignore the relatively small church tax. We use the
national tax tables for a married couple ¯ling jointly with no dependents (1950{1975). The main
data sources are Kukkonen (2000) and the Finnish Tax Administration.
8.8.1 Dividends
From 1950{1992, dividends are taxed as ordinary income. The marginal tax rate on dividends
equals the sum of central and sub-central tax rates:
¿d = ¿pc + ¿ps: (46)
From 1993{2004, Finland uses a dual-income system with full imputation. Dividends are subject to
investment income tax at rate ¿pi and corporate tax is credited back through imputation as in the
United Kingdom (27). Most years, the investment income rate equals the imputation rate so that
¿d = 0. Recently, in 2005{2006, Finland replaces the imputation system with a partial-inclusion
system such that a proportion ¼ of the dividend is taxed as investment income:
¿d = ¼ £ ¿pi: (47)
8.8.2 Capital Gains
Capital gains taxation of stocks begins in 1920. From 1920{1985, short-term capital gains as de¯ned
by a holding period of less than ¯ve years are taxed as ordinary income, while long-term capital
gains are exempt. From 1986{1992, the rules change gradually towards the new system in place
since 1993. An initial (large) amount is tax exempt. A portion ¼ of the capital gain above the
tax-exempt amount is taxed as ordinary income as in (22). The portion depends on the holding





100% , if 0{5 years;





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
100% , if 0{4 years;
80% , if 4{5 years;
50% , if >5 years:
(50)
From 1993{2006, all capital gains on stocks are taxed as investment income as in (43). Since 1986,
a long-term investor has the option to de¯ne the capital gain as 50% of the sales price from 1986{
1992 and 30% from 1993{2006. In our calculations, we ignore this option and the initial tax-exempt
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